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COMMENTS
Injunctive Relief and Section 1985(3): Anti-
Abortion Blockaders Meet the "Ku Klux
Klan Act"
Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more
basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision . . .
whether to end her pregnancy.
Justice Blackmun'
If you think abortion is murder, then act like it's murder. If your child or
my child were in danger, we would physically intervene, with violence, if nec-
essary, or - I should say -force.
Randall Terry 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Anti-abortion activists have employed various tactics in their cam-
paign against abortion. One tactic has been direct action against clinics
providing this service to women by blockading doors, interfering with
customer ingress and egress, destroying equipment, and intimidating
clinic employees.3 Civil actions to dissuade these activities have included
1. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986).
2. Wilkinson, The GospelAccording to Randall Terry, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 25, 1991, at 85, 91.
Randall Terry is the National Director and Founder of Operation Rescue, an unincorporated
association whose members oppose abortion and its legalization. To advance its principle goals of
stopping abortion and ending its legalization, Operation Rescue engages in demonstrations it terms
"rescues." Generally a "rescue" takes place at a facility where abortions are performed. Demon-
strators, whom Operation Rescue refers to as "rescuers," intentionally try to prevent women from
having abortions by blockading the clinic's entrances and exits. By effectively closing clinics in this
manner "rescuers" view their blockades as "rescues" of fetuses scheduled for abortion. National
Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1487-88 (E.D. Va. 1989), aj5dper curiam,
914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111
S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
3. See, eg., Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989). Plaintiff-appellant, the Northeast Women's Center, Inc., presented
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
allegations of anti-trust violations,4 third party tortious interference with
contractual relations,5 and RICO6 violations based on a claim that these
tactics exhibit a pattern of extortionate acts as defined under the Hobbs
Act.7
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the recent use of the
federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), to obtain injunctive relief
against anti-abortion protestors who interfere with patient ingress and
egress at facilities which provide abortion services.8 The importance of
this discussion took on an added dimension, February 25, 1991, when the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic.9 The questions presented by this case include: (1) Do "women
seeking abortions" constitute a valid class for the purposes of the "class
animus" requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (2) Is opposition to abor-
tion per se discrimination against women for the purpose of the "class
animus" requirement of 42 U.S.C § 1985(3); and (3) Do purely private
actors who hinder access to abortion facilities violate the federal constitu-
evidence at trial establishing that employees had been knocked down and injured while attempting to
prevent defendants and others from forcing their way into the clinic. Once inside the facility, de-
fendants damaged and dismantled clinic equipment. One employee resigned as a result of this har-
assment and would not resume her position until the Center installed a sophisticated security system;
another lost work time as a result of injuries. During another demonstration at the Center, witnesses
testified that they observed:
[d]efendants photographing patients, chanting through bullhorns, blocking building en-
trances, and surrounding and pounding on the windows of employees' cars. In fact an
assistant district attorney who witnessed a demonstration testified that the demonstra-
tors' activity rose to a "frenzy" and that he delayed leaving the Center out of fear for his
physical safety. Videotape evidence revealed demonstrators pushing, shoving and tug-
ging on patients as they attempted to approach the Center, knocking over and crossing
beyond police barricades and blocking the ingress of cars.
Id. at 1345-46. Two employees testified that repeated picketing at their homes, and disruptive dem-
onstrations at the Center, caused them to resign their positions with the clinic. Id. at 1346.
4. See generally Note, The Scope ofNoerr Immunity for Direct Action Protestors. Antitrust Meets
the Anti-Abortionists, 89 COL. L. Rav. 662 (1989).
5. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1347.
6. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provides for a private
cause of action at 18 U.S.C. 1964(c):
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this
chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Id.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (anti-racketeering act making it a crime to interfere with interstate com-
merce by extortion, robbery, or physical violence). For an application of Civil RICO in the context
of militant anti-abortion actions, see McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1342.
8. See ag., New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
9. 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991), appealed from, National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.
Supp. 1483, 1487-88 (E.D. Va. 1989), affld per curiam, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990).
1991] INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND SECTION 1985(3) 857
tional right to interstate travel merely because some patrons of the facil-
ity come from out of state?10 The following exploration of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) will conclude that the answer to each of these questions is
affirmative.
This Comment will begin with a brief history of the Act. Next the
Comment provides an overview of the requirements for establishing a
claim under the act in the context of a clinic trying to protect itself from
militant anti-abortion co-conspirators. In particular, this Comment will
focus on the class-based animus requirement of § 1985(3) and the neces-
sity of establishing a violation of separate rights which the Act can rem-
edy. The central thesis of this Comment is that using § 1985(3) in a civil
action against militant anti-abortion conspirators is consistent with the
text of the statute, and that the problem faced by women and their sup-
porters today - the inability of state and local authorities to secure the
legal option to willfully terminate their pregnancy - is analogous to the
problems faced by newly emancipated blacks and their supporters which
the framers of the Ku Klux Klan Act intended to redress.
II. HISTORY OF THE ACT
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Reconstruction Congress pro-
duced a series of legislation intended to protect civil rights at the federal
level. 1 A portion of this legislation was in direct response to "clandes-
tine bands of private conspirators" which the southern states were either
unwilling or unable to control.' 2 Hard fought freedoms were being made
ineffective by "[k]lansmen [who] rode over the countryside at night, par-
ticularly in the South, intimidating, scourging, and murdering [African-
10. 59 U.S.L.W. 3576 (Feb. 26, 1991). The other two questions presented in Bray are: (4) Are
the respondents' claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) so insubstantial as to deprive the federal courts of
subject matter jurisdiction; and (5) Did the court of appeals err by sustaining the award of attor-
ney's fees against petitioners? Id This Comment will not address the jurisdiction or attorney's fees
questions.
11. During the ten years that followed the Civil War, five important pieces of legislation were
passed to enforce the newly ratified thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. They were:
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1982)) (protecting
voting rights); Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, overruled in part, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (The
Civil Rights Cases) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1984 (1982)) (prohibiting racial discrimination in
public accommodations); Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1982)) (the Ku Klux Klan Act); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (outlawing Black Codes in the former Confederate
states); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433, repealed by Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36
(protecting voting rights).
12. Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Modem Vision of 42 U.S. Section
1985(3), 64 TEx. L. Rav. 527, 536 (1985).
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Americans] in an attempt to overthrow the Reconstruction policy of the
Republican Congress." 1 3 The situation prompted President Ulysses S.
Grant to "urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of
Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the en-
forcement of law in all parts of the United States." 4
On April 20, 1871, in an effort to "enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution," 5 an indignant Congress
responded to conditions in which "the Klan and other lawless elements
were rendering life and property insecure." 6 This statutory response
came to be known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. The statute provided both
civil and criminal penalties 7 for the deprivation of rights. Classes of
people were to be extended a federal remedy for private conspiracies18
which the state was either unwilling or unable to prevent.
Section 1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act provides in part that:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire... for the pur-
pose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of per-
sons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering
the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing
to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws; ... in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more
persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of
the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
13. Id. at 534.
14. CONG. GLoBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1871) (message of President Grant to Congress as
relayed in remarks of Sen. Scott).
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Act was originally entitled "An Act to Enforce the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." See Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch.22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at
42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (1982)). This Act comprises only part of the list of conspiratorial acts which were
prohibited by section 2 of the original Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. See supra note 11.
16. Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH L. REV. 1323, 1334
(1952).
17. The closest remaining criminal analog to § 1985(3) is 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) which in perti-
nent part makes it criminal:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen of
any State, Territory, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having
so exercised the same ....
Id Section 241 was originally enacted as § 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 141, § 6
(1870). For a discussion of§ 241 and its use within the abortion controversy, see generally Copelon,
The Applicability of Section 241 of the Ku Klux Klan Acts to Private Conspiracies to Obstruct or
Preclude Access To Abortion, 10 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 183 (1987).
18. "A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons, by concerted action to accomplish
some unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some lawful purpose by unlawful means." 3 E. DEviTr &
C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACrICE & INSTRUcTIONS, § 103.23 (4th ed. 1987).
[Vol. 39
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property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or depriva-
tion, against any one or more of the conspirators.1 9
The principal concern of the statute's sponsors in the Reconstruc-
tion Congress was to protect newly emancipated blacks and their polit-
ical allies from private conspirators, 20 but "[t]he Congressional debates
evinced concern for all groups subject to the organized lawlessness of the
Ku Klux Klan."12 1 Comments by the Senate sponsor, George Edmunds
of Vermont, illustrate that the Forty-Second Congress' approach to the
class-based animus requirement was not directed exclusively to actions
taken against African-Americans. Senator Edmunds stated that if "it
should appear that this conspiracy was formed against this man because
he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or be-
cause he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter... then this
section could reach it."'22
The early promise of the Ku Klux Klan Act quickly evaporated
when a hostile Supreme Court declared the important criminal conspir-
acy section of the Act void in United States v. Harris,23 removing private
action from the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Harris Court
construed the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment to limit only state
action and held that it could not be used to sustain such a statutory pro-
scription of private action.24
The Harris decision left the Ku Klux Klan Act lying dormant for
almost one hundred years. In 1971, § 1985(3) was rejuvenated by the
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
20. The central theme of the bill's proponents was that the Klan and others were forcibly
resisting efforts to emancipate [African-Americans] and give them equal access to polit-
ical power. The predominant purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the prevalent animus
against [African-Americans] and their supporters. The latter included Republicans gen-
erally, as well as others, such as Northerners who came South with sympathetic views
towards the [African-American].
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983).
21. In addition to African-Americans and Republicans, others threatened by Klan activity in-
cluded Unionists and certain religious groups. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499,
505 (9th Cir. 1979). See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at 567, 695-96 (1871) (remarks of Sen.
Edmunds). See also id. at 426 (remarks of Rep. McKee); Id at 437-39 (remarks of Rep. Cobb).
22. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871).
23. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). The Harris Court followed a rule of severability which caused the
entire statute to be mechanically struck down if any part were to be found constitutionally over-
broad. See id. at 641-42.
24. Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1340
(1952). This was one of a series of cases in which the Supreme Court used strict contructionalism to
systematically dismantle the Reconstruction era's Civil Rights Acts. See generally id at 1323.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
United States Supreme Court in the landmark decision Griffin v. Breck-
enridge.25 By relaxing the Harris Court's inflexible state action require-
ment, the Griffin majority "accord[ed] the words of the statute their
apparent meaning."" After a one-hundred year lag, the statute would
now provide the cause of action for private conspiracies27 that its drafters
envisioned for the Reconstruction era.
III. ESTABLISHING A § 1985(3) CLAIM
The Griffin majority established a four-prong test for sustaining a
§ 1985(3) claim. To prevail a plaintiff must prove that the defendants:
(1) engaged in a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either di-
rectly or indirectly, any person or class of persons the equal protection of
the laws, or the equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) acted
in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) deprived such person or class of
persons the exercise of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States.28
The Griffin court stressed that § 1985(3) may not be construed as a
"general federal tort law,"29 because the limiting "language requiring in-
tent to deprive of equal protection, or equal immunities" necessitates a
demonstration of "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidi-
ously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."3 That
limiting language, the Court determined, was a response to congressional
concern over the enormous sweep of the original language of the "crimi-
nal provision outlawing certain conspiratorial acts done with intent 'to
do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of another
person.' "31 Representative Shellabarger, the House sponsor of the bill,
explained the limiting effect of the amendment:
25. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
26. Id. at 96.
27. It is well settled that § 1985(3) provides a cause of action for private conspiracies. See
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1983); Great Am.
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979); Griffin, 403 U.S. 88, 101, 104 (Con-
gress may constitutionally provide a cause of action for private conspiracies).
28. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102-03.
29. Id. at 101-02.
30. Id. at 102 (emphasis in original). The Court saw the animus requirement as essential:
The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general
federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose - by
requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory
motivation stressed by the sponsors ....
Id.
31. Id at 99-100 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871)).
[Vol. 39
1991] INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND SECTION 1985(3) 861
The object of the amendment is... to confine the authority of this law to
the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of
American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect of
which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equal-
ity of rights as contrasted with his and other citizens' rights, shall be within
the scope of the remedies of this section.3 2
However, as Justice White has noted, this addition does not restrict the
scope of the rights protected under § 1985(3), but does limit the scope of
the Act itself by adding the requirement that a class-based animus moti-
vate the conspirators' actions.33
In Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny,34 the
Court noted that, while creating a cause of action against private conspir-
ators for recovery of damages, § 1985(3) is exclusively remedial and itself
provides no substantive rights.35 Section 1985(3) claims must, therefore,
be based upon other alleged infringements of federally protected rights.36
The remedial nature of § 1985(3) requires that the rights, privileges, and
immunities which it protects have their sources outside of the statute.37
Therefore, to establish the second element of a claim - that the conspir-
acy was for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons the equal protection of the laws, or the equal
privileges and immunities of the laws - a plaintiff must establish: (1) the
violation of a protected right; and (2) an invidiously discriminatory class-
based animus which motivates the violation.38
A. Fulfilling the Class-Based Animus Requirement
The threshold issue in any cause of action brought to invoke the
protection of § 1985(3) is whether the conspirators' actions were moti-
vated by a class-based animus. This subsection will address two issues:
(1) which classes are protected by the Act; and (2) a characterization
problem specific to anti-abortion conspiracies to prevent women from
willfully terminating their pregnancies - whether the class should be
drawn narrowly to envelop only "women seeking abortions," or if the
32. Id. at 100 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess., App. 478 (1871)).
33. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 388 n.5 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting).
34. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
35. Id. at 372.
36. Id.
37. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983).
38. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1979).
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animus is more appropriately described as a gender-based discrimination
against all "women."
1. To Have and To Have Not: Protected Classes Under § 1985(3).
It is difficult for plaintiffs organizing a cause of action to determine which
classes or persons fall within the protective scope of the Ku Klux Klan
Act. The Supreme Court has specifically left open the question of
whether § 1985(3) will secure rights against conspirators motivated by
any class-based animus other than that directed at African-Americans
and their supporters.39 The lack of an authoritative explication of which
classes of people are protected by the Ku Klux Klan Act has led to con-
fusion within the judiciary.40 One court noted the inconsistent treatment
of the class-based animus requirement by stating that a "[c]hanging in-
terpretation has been the only constant."'" Section 1985(3) decisions
rendered by lower federal courts have included classes of people which
traditionally have been found by courts to suffer societal prejudices based
upon race,42 gender,43 and religious affiliation.' However, some courts
39. "We need not decide, given the facts of this case, whether a conspiracy motivated by invidi-
ously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be actionable [under § 1985(3)]." 403 U.S.
at 102 n.9.
40. This confusion is highlighted by two distinct lines of cases within the Ninth Circuit. The
first is represented by Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1985):
[W]e have extended [§ 1985(3)] beyond race only when the class in question can show
that there has been a governmental determination that its members "require and warrant
special federal assistance in protecting their civil rights." (citing DeSantis v. Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir.1979); accord Canlis v. San Joaquin Sherifi's
Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 720 (9th Cir.1981)). More specifically, we require either
that the courts have designated the class in question a suspect or quasi-suspect classifica-
tion requiring more exacting scrutiny or that Congress has indicated through legislation
that the class required special protection. (citing DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 333).
Id at 718.
The second line of cases is represented by Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987). In Gibson, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Carpenters as "having
explicitly restricted [§ 1985(3)] coverage to conspiracies motivated by racial bias." 781 F.2d at 1341.
The court then affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' § 1985(3) claim, because they
had "failed to allege that the law enforcement abuses they claim they suffered were on account of
their race." Id.
41. Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 405 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
42. Fisher v. Shamburg, 624 F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1980) (conspiracy to assault a black man at a
roadside diner); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979) (conspiracy by law enforce-
ment officials against Black Panthers), rev'd in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); Bergman
v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (conspiracy by members of K.K.K. and others
to attack "Freedom Riders" during trip through Alabama).
43. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979) (conspiracy against
female insurance policy holder); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235,
1243-44 (3d Cir. 1979) (male employee injured in furtherance of a conspiracy against female em-
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construing § 1985(3) have not limited its protection to racial or otherwise
suspect classifications and have applied it in more unusual contexts, such
as conspiracies against environmentalists,45 members of a family," or
political opponents.47 Other courts have been more strict in limiting the
coverage of the Ku Klux Klan Act and dismissed claims lodged by hand-
icapped individuals,48 debtors,49 homosexuals,5" and parents who wished
to school their children at home.51
As recently as 1983, the Supreme Court in United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 52 declined to describe the particular
groups, or establish a specific methodology for determining classes pro-
tected under part two of the Griffin test, stating that it was a "close ques-
tion whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus
ployees had proper standing under § 1985(3) to bring action), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366
(1979).
44. St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 688 F. Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1987) ("Religious group" as repre-
sented by Roman Catholic affiliated hospital, was a class falling within the ambit of § 1985(3) as an
alleged object of discriminatory animus); Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982) (con-
spiracy to "deprogram" member of religious cult), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983); Marlowe v.
Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973) (conspiracy against person of Jewish faith).
45. Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975) (because of employee's anti-
pollution efforts and activities directed against the company, the individual defendants, acting for the
company, conspired to take his life and conspired to and did effectuate his dismissal from his job, in
violation of his equal protection and due process rights to an extent sufficient to merit remand),
vacated en banc per curiam as moot, 507 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
46. Azar v. Conly, 456 F.2d. 1382 (6th Cir. 1972) (a single family is a sufficient class).
47. Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975) (political opponents are a sufficient class),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973) (supporters of a
political candidate are a sufficient class).
48. D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1485-87 (7th Cir. 1985) (protection of the
statute denied to handicapped individuals). The Court stated:
Being handicapped is not a historically suspect class such as race, national origin, or sex
nor is the right claimed, employment, a fundamental Constitutional right. Thus handi-
caps differ significantly from classes based on race, ethnic origin, sex, religion and polit-
ical loyalty that have previously been recognized as possibly supporting a [§ ] 1985(3)
claim.
Id. at 1486 (citations omitted); see also Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984).
49. Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979) (debtors denied protection under
§ 1985(3)). But see McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976) (debt-
ors seeking relief under the bankruptcy laws a valid class).
50. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (homosexuals are not a
class within the meaning of § 1985(3)). "The courts have not designated homosexuals a 'suspect' or
'quasi-suspect' classification so as to require more exacting scrutiny of classifications involving
homosexuals." Id. at 333.
51. Clonlara, Inc. v. Runkel, 722 F. Supp. 1442 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (people who wish to provide
for their children's education at home are an insufficient class).
52. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
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other than animus against [African-Americans] and those who champi-
oned their cause, most notably Republicans." 3 The oft-quoted phrase
from Carpenters, that the conspiracy be motivated by "some racial or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus'" 54 ap-
pears to open the door to other types of discrimination, but it has been
interpreted by some courts as limiting the classes cognizable under the
Ku Klux Klan Act to African-Americans."5 Essentially, Justice White's
opinion clarified only one limited issue: that the Carpenter majority was
unwilling to extend § 1985(3) protection "to reach conspiracies moti-
vated by bias towards others on account of their economic views, status,
or activities."' 6 This construction of the statute was based on the Court's
interpretation that the Forty-Second Congress did not intend to "extend
§ 1985(3) into the economic life of the country .... The Court found
that the animus which concerned the legislature was directed "against
[African-Americans] and their sympathizers, and perhaps against
Republicans as a class, but not against economic groups as such." 8
In the wake of Carpenters' failure to clarify the issue, a question
remains as to the proper analysis for determining which classes of per-
sons will be afforded protection under § 1985(3). A first impression re-
view of the statute indicates that women are not excluded from the Act.
The statute's language is broad and speaks of "persons" and "class[es] of
persons" that are provided with a remedy for conspiracies which would
seek to deny them "equal protection of the laws" and "equal privileges
and immunities under the laws." 9 The primary import of this language
limits actionable conspiracies to those motivated by a malice toward the
53. Id. at 836.
54. Id at 829. The Court specifically refused to affirm the lower courts' ruling that § 1985(3)
reaches conspiracies other than those motivated by racial bias. Id at 835.
55. See Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1986) (Carpenters "explicitly
restricted the statutory coverage to conspiracies motivated by racial bias."), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1054 (1987); Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359, 1365-68 (7th Cir. 1985) (Carpenters questions the
ability of victims of non-racial conspiracies to recover under § 1985(3)). The court held that
§ 1985(3) does not reach non-racial political conspiracies, stating that:
Since its decision in Griffin, the [Supreme] Court has not expressly provided a remedy to
a group or class other than blacks. The import of both Griffn and [Carpenters] is that
the legislative history of § 1985(3) does not support extending the statute to conspiracies
other than those motivated by a racial, class-based animus against "[African-Americans]
and their supporters."
Id at 1366.
56. 463 U.S. at 837 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, animus based generally on the eco-
nomic views or commercial interests of a class was beyond the statute's ambit. Id. at 837-39.
57. Id. at 837.
58. Id at 838.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
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victims because of their membership or affiliation with a particular
class.' An additional limitation is that the class is not defined in terms
of the defendants' actions, but must exist independently of their action.61
As indicated by Justice Blackmun, "[a]side from this initial rule of exclu-
sion.., the types of classes covered by the statute are far from clear."'62
The statutory language of § 1985(3) is reminiscent of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Equal Protection
Clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to require laws which
draw classifications based upon gender, race, illegitimacy, alienage, and
national origin to receive some form of heightened judicial scrutiny as to
their propriety.63 Taking its cue from the similar wording of the Equal
Protection Clause, the Sixth Circuit has interpreted the language of the
Ku Klux Klan Act to find that the distinction between classes protected
by § 1985(3) and those that are unprotected is rooted in traditional equal
protection analysis. 64 The classes of individuals protected by the "equal
60. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (citing Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 1976); Lopez v. Arrowhead
Ranches, 523 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1975)). For a further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 105-
111 and accompanying text.
62. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 850. Unlike the Carpenters majority, the dissent viewed Klan vio-
lence as politically rather than racially motivated. The Forty-Second Congress acted to remedy this
violence because they recognized that it would "fester because the general opposition to Reconstruc-
tion policies in the South rendered local law enforcement authorities less likely to protect the rights
of persons affiliated in any way with those policies." Id. at 851. Rather than providing a list of class
traits, the dissent argued that § 1985(3) was "intended to provide a federal remedy for all classes that
seek to exercise their legal rights in unprotected circumstances similar to those of the victims of Klan
violence." Id. at 851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
This view of the Reconstruction era Ku Klux Klan as using violence to promote its political
agenda echoes the conclusion of a majority report of the Senate Select Committee to Investigate
Alleged Outrages in the Southern States: "[lit is clearly established... t]hat the Ku-Klux organiza-
tion does exist, has a political purpose, is composed of members of the democratic or conservative
party, [and] has sought to carry out its purpose by murders, whippings, intimidations, and violence."
H.R. REP. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., xxx-xxxi (1871). See generally Comment, A Cnstruction of
Section 1985(3) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U. CH. L. REV. 402, 408-10 (1979). Although
the characterization of the Klan as a racist organization is true today, in 1871 the Klan:
[W]as primarily a political organization. Understood in the light of its history, the Ku
Klux Klan Act was not an antidiscrimination statute. Its drafters intended instead to
proscribe conspiracies having the object or effect of frustrating the constitutional opera-
tions of government through assaults on the person, property, and liberties of
individuals.
Id. at 403.
63. See generally 2 J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18
(1986).
64. Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1152, 1154 (6th Cir. 1980) (denying protection to picket
line crossers). See also Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 1976) (class-based animus
requirement must be that kind of animus where the discrimination can be said to be "invidious,"
that is, that the class is "based on race, ethnic origin, sex, religion, [or] political loyalty."). Cf.
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protection of the laws" language of § 1985(3) "are those so-called 'dis-
crete and insular' minorities that receive special protection under the
Equal Protection Clause because of inherent personal characteristics." 65
This holding was reaffirmed in National Communication v. Michigan
Public Service,66 in which the Sixth Circuit drew a distinction along the
lines of equal protection analysis, finding that groups which have tradi-
tionally received special protection under suspect classification analysis6 7
are protected by § 1985(3).68 However, the court noted that the statute
"clearly does not reach all torts or equal protection violations measured
by the rationality test."69
Applying this reasoning to gender under traditional equal protection
analysis, distinctions based upon gender are considered invidiously dis-
criminatory.70 Thus, gender-based animus should fall under the scope of
Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating "[W]e require either that the courts
have designated the class in question a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring more exacting
scrutiny or that Congress has indicated through legislation that the class required special protec-
tion." (emphasis added)).
65. Browder, 630 F.2d at 1150. The "discrete and insular" minorities language is taken from
the famous footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1934).
66. 789 F.2d 370 (6th Cir 1986) (denying the protection of the statute to small telephone com-
panies), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
67. Government classifications which distinguish between persons upon some "suspect" basis,
or affect people in terms of their ability to exercise a fundamental right, make up the two categories
of civil liberties cases which receive the "strict scrutiny test" under equal protection review. When
utilizing this test, the Justices will not defer to the decisions of the other branches of government, but
will instead independently determine the degree of relationship which the classification bears to a
constitutionally compelling or overriding end which justifies the limitation of fundamental constitu-
tional values. 2 J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & . YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.3 (1986).
68. National Communication, 789 F.2d at 374.
69. Id. Traditionally the "rational relationship test" is the first standard employed in equal
protection analysis:
The Court will not grant any significant review of legislative decisions to classify persons
in terms of general economic legislation. In this area the justices have determined that
they have no unique function to perform; they have no institutional capability to assess
the scope of legitimate governmental ends in these areas or the reasonableness of classifi-
cations that is in any way superior to that of the legislature. Thus, if a classification is of
this type the Court will ask only whether it is conceivable that the classification bears a
rational relationship to an end of government which is not prohibited by the
Constitution.
2 J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTruTIONAL LAW § 18.3 (1986).
70. See, ag., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973) (discrimination against women
in military service claiming increased benefits for dependent spouse invidious). In Frontiero, a plu-
rality comprised of Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall supported elevated scrutiny of
gender-based classifications. Justice Stewart concurred without reaching the level of scrutiny ques-
tion. Id. at 677. The plurality concluded that gender classifications are inherently suspect: "[W]e
can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage,
or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."
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§ 1985(3). This view is consistent with recent lower court rulings that,
under the Griffin test, both women and blacks are cognizable classes able
to bring actions calculated to protect their civil rights from private con-
spiracies under § 1985(3),71 and that gender-based animus satisfies the
class-based animus requirement.72
The Supreme Court has not given clear guidance on this issue. Its
only brush with the question of whether women constitute a class cogni-
zable under the Ku Klux Klan Act came in American Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Novotny.7 In Novotny, a male employee who alleged
that he had been fired for opposing his employer's discrimination against
women brought suit under both § 198 5(3) and Title VII.74 Reviewing a
Third Circuit ruling that "sex discrimination [is] within the categories of
IM. at 688. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state's 3.2% beer statute invidiously dis-
criminates against males); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (gender-based discrimination in the
appointment of administrators).
71. See, eg., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp 925 (D. Neb. 1986) (women consti-
tute a class cognizable under civil rights conspiracy statute 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)), affirmed, 834 F.2d
697 (8th Cir. 1987), rehearing denied en banc, 840 F.2d 583 (8th Cir.1988).
72. Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988) (section 1985(3) extends beyond conspir-
acies to discriminate against persons based on race, to conspiracies to discriminate against persons
based on sex); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979) (women
purchasers of disability insurance are a sufficient class under § 1985(3)); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F.
Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986); Skadegaard v. Farrell, 578 F. Supp. 1209 (D.N.J. 1984) (discrimina-
tory conspiracies motivated by sex-based animus are within intended scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),
and may be remedied in action for damages brought under that statute).
However, some division has occurred as to the applicability of the Ku Klux Klan Act to sex
discrimination issues. Some courts have denied § 1985(3) protection to women by limiting statutory
coverage to race-based claims. Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 389 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (the
remedies granted by the Civil Rights Acts only protect against discrimination on the basis of race
and have never been construed to ban gender-based discrimination), aO'd, 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir.
1975). Cf Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir.1986); Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d
1359 (7th Cir. 1985). But see Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1983) ("A narrow
interpretation of the statute as protecting only blacks and other analogously oppressed minorities is
untenable in light of the history of the Act." Id. at 387.). Other courts have precluded use of
§ 1985(3) in situations more appropriately addressed by Title VII. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979);
Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 592 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Wis. 1984); Snow v.
Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 582 F. Supp. 53 (D.C. Nev. 1984).
As expressed in his Carpenters dissent, Justice Blackmun's conclusion as to which classes of per-
sons should be within the protective ambit of the Act was more expansive than the majority's. He
concluded that § 1985(3) should protect persons in danger of not receiving the equal protection of
the laws. This qualification would be satisfied when plaintiffs possessed traits whichperse meet this
requirement - race, religion, gender, and national origin - and in situations in which persons with
other traits are subjected to "a systematic maladministration of [the laws], or a neglect or refusal to
enforce their provisions." Carpenters, 463 U.S. 851-853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
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animus condemned by section 1985(3),"' 7  the Supreme Court avoided
the class-based animus problem by reversing the lower court decision on
the separate ground that § 1985(3) could not be used to assert Title VII
rights.76
Recently, however, in a case brought against anti-abortion blockad-
ers, the Second Circuit squarely concluded that women are a protected
class for § 1985(3) purposes. In this case the New York State National
Organization for Women successfully used the Ku Klux Klan Act
against "Operation Rescue."77 Writing for a panel of the Second Circuit,
Judge Cardamone noted that, "by its very language § 1985(3) is necessar-
ily tied to evolving notions of equality and citizenship. As conspiracies
directed against women are inherently invidious, and repugnant to the
notion of equality of rights for all citizens, they are therefore encom-
passed under the Act."' 71 Judge Cardamone juxtaposed this notion with
the evolving status of women in society:
Admittedly, the 42nd Congress' principal concern was to protect newly
emancipated blacks, and those who championed them, against conspiracies.
But the Act's supporters in Congress repeatedly stressed the theme of
preventing "deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of Ameri-
can citizens."
In reviewing history, we should not forget that women in 1871 were
not accorded the full rights of citizenship. Today they are.79
75. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243-44 (3d Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). The action in Novotny was brought by a male employee
who alleged that his discharge was a result of a conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection and
equal privileges and immunities under the laws because of his support for female employees. The
Third Circuit ruled that "members of a conspiracy to deprive women of equal rights are liable under
§ 1985(3) to persons who are injured in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, whether male or
female." Id. at 1244. The Supreme Court did not reach this issue.
76. 442 U.S. at 378 (reasoning that to hold otherwise would be to subvert the detailed enforce-
ment and procedural provisions of Title VII).
77. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 2206 (1990). N.Y.N.O. W. stems from a series of temporary restraining orders (TRO's)
issued during April, May and October 1988, and a permanent injunction issued in January 1989, to
enjoin Operation Rescue from blocking access to medical facilities in and around the New York
metropolitan area. The injunctions as well as court orders compelling discovery were ignored. Id. at
1343-45. Randall Terry, the founder of Operation Rescue, wrote a letter to his followers which
acknowledged his intention to disobey the district court by asking, "[w]ill we let this N.Y.C. court
intimidate us back into silent cooperation with the killing... [o]r will we face down this judge's
order.. .?" Id. One of the demonstrations which were the subject of the lawsuit took place on May
2, 1988. That day demonstrators, some of whom came from as far away as Alaska, blockaded the
office of a Manhattan gynecologist. Five-hundred and three of the demonstrators were arrested.
New York Times, May 3, 1988, at B1, col. 1.
78. NY.N.O.W., 886 F.2d at 1359.
79. Id. at 1358-59 (citations omitted).
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The idea that women would be excluded from a statute which Congress
intended to be a remedy against private conspirators was found to be
"untenable." 0
Originally intended as a limiting strategy, the class-based animus
requirement now results in a haphazard and unpredictable application of
§ 1985(3). Rather than ai methodology for describing classes, the cases
have produced long lists of protected and unprotected groups8' which
often appear interchangeable. As the following section will show, the
anti-abortion blockader cases illustrate that virtually identical fact pat-
terns can produce opposite results.
2. Drawing Class Lines: "Women" vs. "Women Seeking Abor-
tions. " If women constitute a proper class for the purposes of § 1985(3),
is there a distinction between "women," a group worthy of protection
from conspiracies motivated by a gender-based animus, and the category
"women seeking abortions" when judging conspiracies to deny access to
that service? A significant litigation history involving gender-based dis-
crimination within the context of the equal protection clause 2 has al-
lowed the federal courts to develop a methodology for analyzing the
classification "women"; but "women seeking abortions" is not as famil-
iar. Since not all classes or persons fall within the protective scope of
§ 1985(3), the result of this categorization may decide the outcome of the
litigation. If a court concludes that "women" is not an accurate descrip-
tion of the class and decides that "women seeking abortions" is the
proper class definition, the latter class may be distinguished by their de-
sire to obtain a particular medical procedure - historically not an indi-
cia of equal protection denial - and, therefore, be denied § 1985(3)
protection.
In Roe v. Operation Rescue 3 the court concluded that the proper
class definition was "women seeking abortions." The Roe court cited
80. Id. at 1359.
81. Some courts have gone so far as to include long lists of protected and unprotected groups in
their opinions. See, eg., Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 719 n.15
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 967 (1981).
82. See generally 2 J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrTiONAL LAW § 18.20-24
(1986).
83. 710 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (granting plaintiffs' motion for sunmary judgment on the
§ 1985(3) right to travel claim and granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
§ 1985(3) right to abortion claim). On appeal the Third Circuit affirmed on state law grounds and
did not address either the class-based animus requirement or the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant on the § 1985(3) right to abortion claim. Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919
F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990).
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Novotny's finding that § 1985(3) is applicable to gender-based animus,
but then relied on a series of cases in which various subclasses of women
were found to have been afforded protection from private conspiracies
under the Act." Based on these precedents the court found that "'wo-
men seeking abortions' [is] a class entitled to protection under § 1985(3),
and that a conspiracy to deprive women seeking abortions of their consti-
tutional rights is actionable under [the Act].""5
The defendant in Roe, Operation Rescue, contested the validity of
the plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim on the ground that "women seeking abor-
tions [had] made a conscious choice to conceive and were not forced to
become pregnant[;] therefore, they were not a proper § 1985(3) class of
individuals." 6 This defense was rejected by the court which found that
"it is clear that not all women seeking abortions made a conscious, or
even an inadvertent, choice to become pregnant. 87
It is not apparent from the opinions why the Roe court isolated "wo-
men seeking abortions" as a class separate from "women" in general,
while the N. Y.N.O. W. court did not. In N. Y.N.O.. W Judge Cardamone
drew no distinction between the generic "women" and the subclass "wo-
men seeking abortions" for the purpose of finding a § 1985(3) class-based
animus."s The defendants had argued that their actions were not a dem-
onstration of class-based animus because there was no "ill will," and be-
cause their actions were directed at an activity, or a subgroup of women,
rather than women in general.8 9 The N. Y.N.O. W. court rejected these
arguments:
[A]nimus merely describes a person's basic attitude or intention, and be-
cause defendants' conspiracy is focused entirely on women seeking abor-
tions, their activities reveal an attitude or animus based on gender.... In
most cases of invidious discrimination, violations of constitutional rights
occur only in response to the attempts of certain members of a class to do
something that the perpetrators found objectionable.... It is sophistry for
84. Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 629 F. Supp. 849, 853 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (class of abused women
denied adequate protection came within the scope of 1985(3)); Skadegaard v. Farrell, 578 F. Supp.
1209, 1217-19 (D.NJ. 1984) (class of female employees sexually or otherwise harassed by supervisor
came within scope of § 1985(3)).
85. Roe, 710 F. Supp. at 581.
86. Id. at 581 n.3.
87. Id. The other defense to the 1985(3) claim was that defendants' conspiracy was motivated
by economic animus (i.e., "to close down profit-making abortion clinics") and should be exempt
under Carpenter. The court rejected this argument stating that "the notion that defendants' motive
was 'economic' is simply not believable in light of the record" which indicated that one of the target
clinics was a nonprofit organization. Id.
88. NY.N.O.W, 886 F.2d 1339, 1360 (2d Cir. 1989).
89. Id. at 1359.
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defendants to claim a lack of class-based animus because their actions are
directed only against those members of a class who choose to exercise par-
ticular rights, but not against class members whose actions do not offend
them. The denial of ill-will towards the women they target and the claim
that defendants' actions will benefit these women amount to an argument
that "we are doing this for your own good"; a contention that usually
shields one's actual motive.90
From the two plaintiffs' perspectives on the threshold issue of class-
based animus, the outcomes of N. YN.O. W. and Roe were the same;
class-based animus was found. However, when a variety of such sub-
classes are drawn, the resulting interpretations can cloud the issue of who
will be protected by § 1985(3) and produce inconsistent holdings. For
example, two district courts in the Ninth Circuit have reached opposite
conclusions. In Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates
For Life, Inc.,91 the court held that the plaintiffs constituted "a class of
women who choose to exercise their constitutional right of privacy by
having an abortion... [that was] analytically indistinguishable from a
class of women who purchase disability insurance."92 The court rea-
soned that in light of a Ninth Circuit decision in which women purchas-
ers of disability insurance were found to be a sufficient class for § 1985(3)
protectio'n,93 and because the complaint alleged discrimination against a
particular class of women, "women seeking abortions" would comprise
90. Id. at 1359-60 (emphasis in original).
The leaders of the militant anti-abortion movement deny any animus or ill will toward the women
they blockade. The affidavit of Randall Terry, founder of Operation Rescue, is typical of their ex-
pressed attitude:
Nothing could be further from the truth than a claim that I act with an invidiously
discriminatory animus toward women, generally, or toward abortion-bound women,
particularly. Jesus did not condemn the woman at the well. As a follower of Jesus
Christ, I do not have the luxury of condemning others who share my common human
frailties.
My abortion-related protest activities have nothing to do with hatred for any woman
or a desire to treat any woman or grouping of woman [sic] in a discriminatory fashion.
Rather, rescue is a form of repentance for my personal failures that led to abortion on
demand in this country, and that permit abortion on demand to continue in this country.
When I have participated in abortuary blockades in the past, I have never acted in a
way fairly described as discriminatory toward women or abortion-bound women.
National Org. of Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 300, 313-14 Attachment B (D.D.C.
1989).
91. 712 F. Supp. 165 (D. Or. 1988), aff'd, 859 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at 169.
93. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979).
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"a class of women that may be protected under § 1985(3)." 94
Distinguishing between "women" and "women seeking abortions"
when drawing class lines for a § 1985(3) action against anti-abortion ac-
tivists has meant the difference between a viable § 1985(3) action and one
precluded by the class-based animus requirement. In another Ninth Cir-
cuit decision, National Abortion Federation v. Operation Rescue,95 the
court concluded that "women seeking abortions is not a class intended to
be protected by the Ku Klux Klan Act."9 6 Citing Portland Feminist,
Judge Tashima interpreted that holding as implying that "any 'particular
[sub]class of women' is a protected class." 97 He criticized this approach
because:
[I]f the animus is directed at a particular class of women; then, by defini-
tion, it is not directed at other classes of women or at women as a class. If
that is so, then the discrimination cannot be gender-based[;] it separates
persons of the same gender from each other and, obviously, on a basis other
than by gender. The inquiry, thus, must be made without respect to gender,
i e., it is the "seeking abortion" trait which animates the defendants' actions
and must be the basis for making the § 1985(3) analysis.98
Judge Tashima then concluded: "Although women, under certain cir-
cumstances, still have a constitutional right to seek an abortion, the
courts have never designated 'abortion seekers' as a class requiring exact-
ing scrutiny."99
Tashima's characterization of "women seeking abortions" as a gen-
der neutral classification distinguishes the target of the anti-abortion
protestors' actions from all other classifications. If the line for the class-
based animus requirement is drawn in this manner, then, following equal
protection guidelines, the protective ambit of § 1985(3) would not cover
the target group only if the non-targeted class extended beyond the ge-
neric "men" to included "women not seeking abortions." Thus,
Tashima's reasoning concludes that there are two groupings: (1) the tar-
94. Portland Feminist, 712 F. Supp. at 169 (D.Or. 1988), aff'd, 859 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1988).
95. 721 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
96. Id at 1170 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 1171 (citation omitted). The opinion states that:
If this principle were carried to its logical conclusion, the following illogical result would
obtain: Because women are a protected class, any subclass of women is also a protected
class. Because men are not a protected class, any subclass of men is also an unprotected
class. Therefore, eg., a class of homosexual women would be protected, but a class of
homosexual men would not be.
L at 1171 n.4.
98. Id. at 1171.
99. Id.
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get group, "abortion seekers"; and (2) the non-target group, "those not
seeking abortions," which includes both women and men. This sophistry
refuses to recognize that the harm done by anti-abortion blockaders is
not limited to the subset "women seeking abortions." Rather, blockaders
harm all women by trying to deny them reproductive control.
This reasoning is similar to the conclusion reached by a majority of
the Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello." That case was an equal pro-
tection challenge to the validity a California state-run disability system
which did not cover any work loss resulting from normal pregnancy.
The Court held that, in the absence of a showing of an intent to discrimi-
nate against women, laws which make pregnancy classifications do not
constitute gender-based discrimination.101 In an infamous footnote, Jus-
tice Stewart wrote that the "program divides potential recipients into two
groups - pregnant women and nonpregnant personsL;] . . . the first
group is exclusively female the second includes members of both
sexes."102 The Court concluded that pregnancy is "an objectively identi-
fiable physical condition with unique characteristics" that lacks an iden-
tity with gender.10 3 Thus, all non-pregnant people were thought to be
similarly situated.
This decision has been heavily criticized.1 "4 The most compelling
argument that pregnancy-based classification is in fact gender classifica-
tion is the capacity argument posited by scholars such as Ruth Colker.
Professor Colker states:
The category of non-pregnant persons does include both women and men;
however, the Court's error was in not recognizing that women and men are
not similarly situated in their non-pregnant status. Nearly all women are
affected by pregnancy-based discrimination irrespective of whether they are
pregnant, because nearly all women have the capacity to become preg-
nant.... A man, however, cannot become pregnant and is not affected by
the presence or absence of maternity leave in the same way. 0
Thus, the Court's reasoning failed to recognize that the treatment of
pregnancy affects gender equality.
Applying this reasoning to Judge Tashima's notion that "abortion
100. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
101. Id at 496-97, 497 n.20.
102. IdL at n.20.
103. IdL
104. See, ag., Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 983 (1984)
(noting that criticism of Geduldig had risen to the level of "a cottage industry").
105. Colker, The Female Body and the Law: On Truth and Lies, 99 YALE L.J. 1159, 1174 (1990)
(review of Z. EIsENSTN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAWS (1988)).
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seekers" is a gender-neutral classification, it is clear that the other im-
plied category, "those not seeking an abortion," is composed of men and
women that are not similarly situated. Men do not have the capacity to
become pregnant, thus they will never seek an abortion, and as a result
they can never be subjected to the discriminatory conduct of the anti-
abortion blockaders. For the most part all of the women that are in
Judge Tashima's "not seeking an abortion" category, will at some point
during their lives, have the capacity to become pregnant and, therefore,
may choose to exercise their option to have an abortion. Thus, the anti-
abortion blockaders' actions impact women in a sex-specific way, and, as
such, is gender-based discrimination. The option to have an abortion
exists independently of the desire to exercise it and does not come into
being just at the moment a woman elects to exercise that option; just as
the right to vote does not evaporate with the closing of the polls.
In addition to its conclusion that "abortion seekers" can be appro-
priately described as a gender-neutral classification, Judge Tashima's
holding raises another important issue: the propriety of defining the class
solely on the basis of the defendants' actions. To allow the defendants'
actions to exclusively determine the § 1985(3) class analysis is effectively
to remove from the judiciary the ability to determine the proper class.
Thus a savvy conspirator in a potential § 1985(3) action has much room
to determine his own fate.
This issue was first addressed in Carpenters:
[T]he intended victims must be victims not because of any personal malice
the conspirators have toward them, but because of their membership in or
affiliation with a particular class. Moreover, the class must exist indepen-
dently of the defendants' actions; that is, it cannot be defined simply as the
group of victims of the tortious action. 106
In Askew v. Bloemker,10 7 the court concluded that, for the purposes
of § 1985(3), a "class" is a group of individuals sharing "common char-
acteristics," and can not be created solely by the challenged action. 10 8
Thus, in Askew, the court found that § 1985(3) did not extend to the
class of persons whose homes were raided by the defendants in a lawsuit
challenging raids on the plaintiffs' home."° Although the class must ex-
ist independently of the conspirators' actions, nevertheless:
106. 463 U.S. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
107. 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1976).
108. Id. at 678. Accord Rogers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 203 (7th Cir.
1985) (a § 1985(3) class is a readily identifiable group).
109. 548 F.2d at 678.
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[C]ases now make it plain that it is the agreement vel non among the alleged
conspirators to single out a particular group or class for discriminatory in-
terference with constitutional rights that should itself define the class for
purposes of section 1985(3). If a conspiracy actionable under section
1985(3) does exist, it will have defined for itself the group or class or per-
sons it intends to victimize. 110
In Volk v. Coler, 11 the court found that "proving a violation of one's
right to be free from ... sexual harassment does not require proof of
discrimination against an entire class of women (or men). Likewise to
succeed under § 1985(3), Volk need not prove that there was an agree-
ment to discriminate against an entire class of women."' 12
The agreement among the anti-abortion blockaders is to act in a
manner that will result in the denial of abortion to all women. Their
action may target only women who may be seeking that procedure, but
the intended effect is to eliminate this procedure as an option for any and
all women. An analogous situation would be if African-Americans were
subjected to blockading activities when they tried to enter a polling place.
Voting rights exist independently of the exercise of that right. Although
a portion of the African-American population may elect not to exercise
their right to vote, few would argue that interfering with African-Amei-
cans in the exercise of that right is somehow limited to "African-Ameri-
cans seeking to vote." The action clearly impacts the entire race and,
therefore, the proper class for § 1985(3) purposes would be African-
Americans.
The analysis in Roe indicates that the court viewed the class "wo-
men seeking abortions" as distinct from the generic "women" because of
an unpredictable circumstance - an unwanted pregnancy. This reason-
ing begs the question of whether distinguishing between women seeking
abortions and women not seeking abortions is appropriate when drawing
lines for the class-based animus requirement. The two categories are dif-
ferentiated only by the operation of a chance event coupled with a desire
to exercise a legal option. The temporal nature of pregnancy also clashes
with the notion of "immutable characteristics" because all "women seek-
ing abortions" will return to the class "women," regardless of the out-
110. Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F. Supp. 1157, 1167 (D.D.C. 1982). See Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d
708,718-19 (5th Cir. 1981). Cf. Kimble v. McDuffy, 648 F.2d 340, 346-47 (5th dCr. 1981) (en bane),
cert denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981). See also Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d
711, 719 n. 15 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 967 (1981). See generally Hampton v. Hanra-
han, 600 F.2d 600, 624 (7th Cir. 1979), cert, denied on these grounds rev'd in part on other grounds,
446 U.S. 754 (1980).
111. 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988).
112. Id. at 1434.
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come of their search for an abortion. The permeability of this boundary
suggests that the distinction between the two groupings is artificial be-
cause the only operative "discrete and insular" classification based on an
inherent characteristic is the generic "women." Necessarily, since only
women get pregnant and therefore only women will seek abortions, ani-
mus against a class of women seeking abortions is animus against wo-
men. The "women seeking abortions" classification also ignores the fact
that women who go to the clinics for other reproductive health care are
interfered with as well. Tashima's conclusion effectively eliminates from
the class women who successfully had an abortion at a clinic the day
before it was blockaded. It also ignores a major premise of the women's
movement, namely, that to control their lives, career, or status, women
require the option of a safe and secure abortion."1 In short, only the
female of any species is the one that bears young or produces eggs. Con-
sequently, it is absurd to differentiate among women based on how they
attempt to exercise control over the event of pregnancy.1 14
When Operation Rescue targets a clinic, it seeks to prevent women
seeking abortions from exercising a right that is available only to their
gender. Operation Rescue is trying to deprive women of precisely that
right. Thus, as the Second Circuit recognized, "women seeking abor-
tions" is a tautological description of the generic "women" with a redun-
dancy caused by the fact that only women can seek abortions and,
consequently, the ability to "seek abortions" is gender-specific. There-
fore, the answer to the question presented in Bray, "[d]o 'women seeking
abortions' constitute a valid class for purposes of the 'class animus' re-
quirement of § 1985(3)" is yes. That classification is no more than a
tautological extension of the class "women" which is a group covered by
the protective ambit of § 1985(3). Finally, because abortion is a gender-
113. See generally K. LUKER, ABORTION & THE POLrTICS OF MOTHERHOOD 110-121 (1984).
Although tangential to this discussion, reproductive control extends beyond the right to safe and
secure abortion and contraceptives. As the feminist legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon has de-
scribed it:
The right to reproductive control... would include the abortion right but would not
center on it. Women would have more rights when they carry a fetus: sex equality
rights. Women who are assaulted and miscarry, women who are forced to have abor-
tions and women who are denied abortions, women who are sterilized, and women who
are negligently attended at birth all suffer deprivation of reproductive control.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281, 1318 (1991).
114. Congress has recognized that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is gender-based
discrimination even though pregnant women form a subclass of women. See Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat.
2076 (1978) which adds § 701(k) to Title VII in order to proscribe discriminatory treatment of
employees based on pregnancy or childbirth as sex discrimination.
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specific right, opposition to abortion which physically interferes with the
free exercise of that legal option is per se discrimination against women
for the purposes of the "class animus" requirement.
B. § 1985(3) as a Remedy: Establishing Rights Interfered with by
Anti-Abortion Blockaders
The United States Supreme Court has defined § 1985(3) as a reme-
dial statute which creates no substantive rights.1"' Therefore, once class-
based animus has been established as a motivation for the conspirators'
actions, plaintiffs must demonstrate that separate rights have been hin-
dered as a result of the conspiracy. A threshold issue then arises as to
whether a plaintiff must show that state action has infringed a right or
whether an infringement by private actors will suffice to state a claim.
The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits
any State from denying any person the equal protection of the laws, but
the United States Supreme Court has determined that this protection is
"against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals."'16 The
majority opinion in Griffin recognized a similarity between the § 1985(3)
provision requiring that the conspiracy be "for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of .the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws,""1 7 and the wording of the Equal Protection Clause of the four-
teenth amendment prohibiting a State from denying to "any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." ' 8 The Court
115. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372, 376 (1979). Justice
Blackmun's thoughtful dissent in Carpenters challenges the Novotny Court's construction of
§ 1985(3) as exclusively remedial. See Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 847 n.10. The original intent of the
Forty-Second Congress was to provide a list of actionable crimes which would allow enforcement of
the equal protection of the laws in the face of state inaction. Id at 844. During the house debates,
concerns were raised about whether the bill would "usurp state authority over local and individual
crimes." Id at 842-43. The remarks of Representative Garfield indicate that:
(He] did not believe that Congress had the power to displace the criminal jurisdiction of
the States. In his view, however, the Fourteenth Amendment provided citizens with an
affirmative and congressionally enforceable right to equal protection of the laws: "the
provision that the States shall not 'deny the equal protection of the laws' implies that
they shall afford equal protection."
Id at 843 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 153 (April. 4, 1871)).
116. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 92 (1951) (emphasis in original) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
118. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
878 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
noted that "[a] century of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication has...
made it understandably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a
deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by private persons. Yet
there is nothing inherent in the phrase that requires the action working
the deprivation to come from the State." 119 The broader ambit of
§ 1985(3) was demonstrated in Griffin, where the facts"' allowed the
Supreme Court to premise federal jurisdiction on the thirteenth amend-
ment121 and the right of interstate travel,122 both of which are constitu-
tionally protected from private and official infringement. By so doing,
the Court avoided addressing the scope of § 1985(3) under the fourteenth
amendment,1 23 and, consequently, did not explicate a specific state action
requirement for private conspiracies to deprive rights which have their
source in that amendment.
Twelve years later in United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v.
Scott,1 24 the United States Supreme Court specifically endorsed the four-
part test developed in Griffin 25 and reaffirmed the holding that the Ku
Klux Klan Act was "intended to reach private conspiracies which in no
way involved the state." '26 However, the majority opinion contained
some potentially confusing dicta in which Justice White noted that
§ 1985(3) does not extend to private conspiracies to interfere with first
amendment rights unless there is some state involvement. 12 7 The major-
119. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 97. The Court continued by saying, "[i]ndeed, the failure to mention
any such requisite can be viewed as an important indication of congressional intent to speak in
§ 1985(3) of all deprivations of 'equal protection of the laws' and 'equal privileges and immunities
under the laws,' whatever their source." Id. (emphasis in original).
120. Griffin arose from an incident in 1966. Three African-American citizens of Mississippi
were passengers in a car being driven in Tennessee when the two white defendants, who mistakenly
believed that the driver of the car was a civil rights worker, forced the car to stop. The white men
then held the occupants of the car at bay with firearms and maliciously clubbed them all, causing
each to be severely injured. See 403 U.S. 88, 90-91 (1971).
121. U.S. CONST., amend. XIII.
122. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105.
Some privileges and immunities of citizenship, such as the right to engage in inter-
state travel and the right to be free of the badges of slavery, are protected by the Consti-
tution against interference by private action, as well as impairment by state action.
Private conspiracies to deprive individuals of these rights are, as the Court held in [Grif-
fin], actionable under § 1985(3) without regard to any state involvement.
Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 383 (1979).
123. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 107.
124. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
125. I . at 829-30.
126. Id at 834.
127. Id. at 833. It is important to note that the state involvement requirement is neither the
same as the state action requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor is it the traditional "state action"
required to enforce many individual rights contained in the text of the Constitution, the Bill of
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ity reasoned that the first and fourteenth amendments "restrain only offi-
cial conduct." '1 28 Therefore, the Constitution cannot guarantee such
privileges as freedom of speech or the right of assembly vis-a-vis private
individuals.12 9 If the source of the rights to be vindicated by § 1985(3) is
either the first or fourteenth amendment, then it is "necessary for [a
plaintiff] to prove that the State was somehow involved in or affected by
the conspiracy."'130
Therefore, the substantive rights which a plaintiff can assert in a
§ 1985(3) cause of action fall into two categories: (1) those that are so
fundamental in nature as to be asserted against purely private conspira-
cies; and (2) those rights which restrain only official conduct and require
an additional demonstration of state involvement to be asserted against
private conspirators.
1. The Right to Travel. Recent § 1985(3) litigation against anti-
abortion conspirators has centered around two possible rights denied to
women: (1) the right to travel, which can be asserted against purely pri-
vate conspiracies; and (2) the right to an abortion, which has the attend-
ant state involvement requirement. Pro-choice advocates have effectively
invoked the protective ambit of § 1985(3) by asserting that anti-abortions
blockaders interfere with the right to travel of women whose passage
they hinder or prevent. However, one of the questions presented by Bray
is whether purely private actors who hinder access to a clinic providing
abortions violate the federal constitutional right to interstate travel be-
cause some of its patients come from out of state to receive its services.
The right to free and unimpeded interstate travel is guaranteed by
the Constitution against both private and official encroachment. The
Supreme Court has firmly established that this right does not rest on the
fourteenth amendment, but is protected from purely private interfer-
ence. 3' As stated in Griffln, "[the Supreme Court's] cases have firmly
Rights, and the various amendments to the Constitution which protect individual liberties. For an
explanation of the state action requirement, see generally 2 . NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16 (1986). See also infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
128. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833. Although the Carpenters dicta discusses the state involvement
requirement it is important to note that the Court did not rule on this issue. Rather, the dispositive
ground for overruling the case was a failure to fulfill the class-based animus requirement. Id. at 834.
129. Id. at 833. This would appear to be the same as the "state action" requirement. However,
this similarity is specious. For a discussion of the "state involvement requirement," see infra
§ III.B.2.
130. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833.
131. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-06; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
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established that the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected,
does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and can be as-
sert[ed] against private as well as governmental interference." '132 There-
fore, rather than being a restraint on state action, deprivations of the
right to interstate travel are actionable under § 1985(3) without estab-
lishing any form of state involvement in the conspiracy.
133
In the landmark right to travel case of Shapiro v. Thompson, 134 the
Supreme Court determined that, to assert interference with the right to
travel, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the defendant completely
thwarted the right to travel. Rather, the Court concluded that is neces-
sary to show only that the right to travel was somehow penalized. The
Shapiro Court struck down three statutes which denied welfare benefits
to people who had not lived within the jurisdiction for at least a year.
The court found that the interference with interstate travel stemmed
from the deterrent effect the statute had on the entry of indigent per-
sons.1 35 Thus, under Shapiro there is no requirement that the right to
travel be physically impeded, only that it be deterred. The Supreme
Court has also specifically held that the right to travel includes the right
to travel interstate to receive abortion services, and "protects persons
who enter [a state] seeking the medical services that are available
there." 136
Women denied entrance into a clinic because of blockading activity
are severely penalized. Randall Terry, founder of Operation Rescue, 13
7
has stated that the purpose of these "rescue" demonstrations is to pre-
vent any activity from taking place at a targeted clinic and that "while
the child-killing facility is blockaded, no one is permitted to enter past
the rescuers... [d]octors, nurses, patients, staf, abortion-bound women,
families of abortion-bound women - all are prevented from entering the
abortuary while the rescue is in progress. "138
In its finding of facts, the National Organization for Women v. Oper-
132. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105 (Justice Harlan dissented on the right to travel issue).
133. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 832-33.
134. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
135. Id.
136. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (in-state residence requirement as prerequisite to
abortion services violates right to travel).
137. See supra note 2.
138. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va. 1989),
affidper curiam, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nora Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, I11 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
By preventing women from entering the facility, Operation Rescue claims to have "rescued"
fetuses scheduled for abortion. Id at 1488.
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ation Rescue court found that blockades effectively accomplished Opera-
tion Rescue's stated goal of preventing both patients and medical
personnel from entering the clinic. 139 In addition to physically blockad-
ing all of the clinic's entrances and exits, "rescuers" also "defaced clinic
signs, damaged fences and blocked ingress into and egress from the
clinic's parking lot by parking a car in the center of the parking lot en-
trance and deflating its tires."'14° Finally, the court found that members
of Operation Rescue had "strewn nails on the parking lots and public
streets abutting the clinics to prevent the passage of any cars." "'
The effect of this purposeful action was the creation of a "substantial
risk that existing or prospective patients may suffer physical or mental
harm."' 42 Evidence was introduced which showed that, "for some wo-
men who elect to undergo an abortion, clinic medical personnel prescribe
and insert a pre-abortion laminaria to achieve cervical dilation. In these
instances, timely removal of the laminaria is necessary to avoid infection,
bleeding and other potentially serious complications."' 43 These facts
clearly indicate the substantial harm to the victims of Operation Rescue's
blockading actions.
In N.Y.N.O. W., the Second Circuit found that women seeking abor-
tions often travelled to New York to avail themselves of its superior med-
ical facilities." 4 Blockades of clinics, therefore, "constitute an
infringement upon these women's right to travel. Thus, plaintiffs [were]
entitled to summary judgment on their § 1985(3) claim due to the depri-
vation of the individual right of a citizen to unhindered interstate travel
to seek medical services."' 45 The circuit court thus affirmed the district
court ruling that interstate travel need not actually be thwarted. Rather,
to satisfy the injury element, plaintiffs need only show that the exercise of
the right to travel was penalized.' 4" In N. Y.N.O. W., this was demon-
strated by undisputed facts which established that the "defendants' activ-
ities obstruct[ed] access to medical facilities to women who have traveled
from out-of-state" and that defendants "have repeatedly forcibly denied
139. IM at 1489.
140. Id
141. Id at 1489-90.
142. Id at 1489.
143. Id
144. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1360 (2d Cir. 1989), cert
denied, 110 S. CL 2206 (1990).
145. Id at 1361.
146. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1260, n.15 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
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access to abortion facilities in the New York area, and they intend to
continue to do so." 14 7
In National Organization for Women, the court found that "substan-
tial numbers" of the patients utilizing the services of clinics in the Wash-
ington Metropolitan area came from out of state.148  The court
concluded that " '[r]escue' demonstrations, by blocking access to clinics,
therefore have the effect of obstructing and interfering with the interstate
travel of these women." 149 The court was unpersuaded by defendant
blockaders' argument that "clinic closings affect only intra-state travel,
from the street to the doors of the clinics." ' Rejecting this line of
reasoning, the court stated: "[w]ere the court to hold otherwise, interfer-
ence with the right to travel could occur only at state borders. This con-
spiracy . . . effectively deprives organizational plaintiffs' non-Virginia
members of their right to interstate travel." 151
The § 1985(3) anti-abortion cases demonstrate that militant anti-
abortion groups which engage in blockading activity generate substantial
risks to patients seeking the various medical services available at these
clinics. It is reasonable to conclude that this substantial risk is a deter-
rent to those women that travel from out-of-state to the clinics. As a
result, the answer to the question presented by Bray - whether purely
private actors who hinder access to a clinic providing abortions violate
the federal constitutional right to interstate travel because some of its
patients come from out of state to receive its services - is yes.
Establishing that anti-abortion conspirators have interfered with the
right to travel has been an effective strategy which allows clinics that
offer pregnancy-related services to invoke the protection of § 1985(3) and
it should continue to be so if the Supreme Court respects the holding of
Shapiro and recognizes that militant anti-abortion blockaders have a de-
terrent effect on women who travel interstate to receive pregnancy re-
lated services.
147. Id. at 1259-60.
148. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (E.D. Va. 1989),
a.f'd per curiam, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Women's Health
Clinic, II1 S. CL 1070 (1991). The court noted that,"[flor example twenty (20) to thirty (30) per-
cent of patients served at the Commonwealth Women's Clinic in Falls Church, Virginia come from
out of state. Records for these patients reflect permanent residence addresses in Maryland, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, New Jersey, New York, and Florida." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id at 1493.
151. Id.
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2. The Right to an Abortion. Civil plaintiffs seeking injunctive re-
lief from militant "right to life" conspirators by alleging interference
with the right to abortion 152 have encountered two difficulties: (1) over-
coming the state involvement requirement; and (2) a reluctance on the
part of the judiciary to decide a perceived constitutional issue when other
grounds for disposition are available.
Unlike the right to unimpeded interstate travel, a plaintiff alleging
interference with a right protected only against state interference must
prove that the "State was somehow involved in or affected by the con-
spiracy." '153 The concept of the state inVolvement requirement is some-
what elusive. The Supreme Court's most succinct description came in
Novotny where it stated that "if private persons take conspiratorial action
that prevents or hinders the constituted authorities of any State from
giving or securing equal treatment, the private persons would cause those
authorities to violate the fourteenth amendment; the private persons
would then have violated § 1985(3).' '154
The state involvement requirement is not the same as the state ac-
tion requirement found in traditional equal protection analysis. 5 5 The
152. Eg., National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D.Va. 1989),
aft'd per curiain, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, II1 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
153. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833. In response to the concerns about federal encroachment into
the states' criminal jurisdiction, the list of actionable crimes was replaced with a civil cause of action
for persons injured by the conspiracy under § 1985(3). Id. at 844. Blackmun's dissent concludes:
[B]y limiting [§ 1985(3)] to deprivations of equal protection and of equal privileges and
immunities, the Forty-Second Congress avoided the constitutional problems... of a
general federal criminal law. The effect of that language was to limit federal jurisdiction
to cases in which persons were the victims of private conspiracies motivated by the intent
to interfere in the equal exercise and enjoyment of their legal rights.
Id. at 847.
To buttress his construction of the statute (see supra note 114), Blackmun refers to the Court's
statement in Griffin that "there is nothing inherent in the [wording of the statute] that requires the
action working the deprivation to come from the State." 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971). Blackmun argues
that this dicta "implicitly recognizes that the Members of the Forty-Second Congress believed that
the right to equal protection of the laws could be violated by private action." Carpenters, 463 U.S. at
848 n.12. The dissent asserts that § 1985(3)'s limiting language was designed to prevent the creation
of a "general federal criminal or tort law" not to impose a "state-action or state-involvement require-
ment." Id. at 849. Justice Blackmun would find this source of congressional power in the commerce
clause. Id. at 849 n.14.
154. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 384 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). See also Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, 681 F.
Supp. 688 (D. Or. 1988) (conspiracy to deprive women of their federal constitutional right to choose
abortion was actionable under § 1985(3) only upon showing of state action; purely private conspir-
acy by "right to life" group was not actionable).
155. Regarding this difference, the Supreme Court has stated:
Had § 1985(3)... prohibited conspiracies to deprive any person of the Equal Protection
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fourteenth amendment specifically addresses itself to limiting the action
that can be taken by either the federal government or the states. If a
deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause occurs,
a private citizen will only be protected if the alleged wrongdoer is either a
person or entity acting on behalf of the government.15 6 The state action
requirement of the fourteenth amendment means that if an alleged
wrongdoer does not have sufficient contacts with the government, then
the activity is free from constitutional limitation and the aggrieved party
will receive no relief from the federal courts.1 57 The difference between
the state action requirement and § 1985(3)'s state involvement require-
ment was best described in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Carpenters:
The Court does not require that the conspirators be state officials or act
under color of state law. Instead, the requirement is that the conspiracy
intend to cause the State or a person acting under color of state law to
deprive the victims of the conspiracy of their constitutional rights."5
The Supreme Court has said that a woman's right to choose to have
an abortion "is fundamental." 1 9 However, this right is based on the
right to privacy which is protected from state interference by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Therefore, most courts have interpreted Carpenters
to require a plaintiff to demonstrate some state involvement. 160 The Dis-
trict Court in N. Y.N.O. W. found this requisite state involvement when
police were rendered incapable of securing equal access to medical serv-
ices for women seeking abortions. The conspirators caused the state in-
volvement in two ways: 1) by blockading clinics; and 2) by refusing to
notify police of their next target cinic.1 6 1 These acts were found to have
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment or freedom of speech guaranteed
by the First Amendment, it would be untenable to contend that either of those provi-
sions could be violated by a conspiracy that did not somehow involve or affect a state.
Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 831.
156. Justice Rehnquist developed a test for determining the presence of state action in Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Justice Rhenquist stated that "the inquiry must be
whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regu-
lated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 358.
157. 2 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrrTIONAL LAW § 16.1 (1986).
158. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 840 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986). The impact of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 110 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), is unclear.
See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
160. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833.
161. N.YN.O. W., 704 F. Supp. at 1260. The ruling by the district court in N.Y.N.O.W. is
inconsistent with the finding in Roe v. Operation Rescue that the failure of anti-abortion protestors to
notify police of the intended sites of their blockade was too minimal to satisfy the state involvement
requirement. See Roe, 710 F. Supp. at 583.
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satisfied the Novotny test by preventing the local authorities from being
able to secure equal protection for the clinics' patients.
Many of the fact patterns found in today's § 1985(3) claims demon-
strate the inability of local authorities to cope with Operation Rescue's
militant protests. A week's worth of protests triggered N. YN.O. W. 162
Based on assurances by the New York City Police Department that they
would be able to ensure access to any targeted clinic, a temporary re-
straining order (TRO) did not include any specific language prohibiting
blockades. On Monday May 2, 1988, despite the previous assurance by
the police, the gynecologist's office in Manhattan targeted by Operation
Rescue was closed until 1:15 P.M. when the demonstration ended. For
most of the day police were either unwilling or unable to invoke the first
TRO, prohibiting protestors from physically interfering with patients
trying to enter the building, despite the fact that pro-choice counter dem-
onstrators pleaded with them to do so.163 Five-hundred and three block-
aders sat on the sidewalk for five hours before finally being arrested by
the police. 64
The paralysis of police in the face of anti-abortion blockades is
analogous to the inability or unwillingness of the states to enforce their
own laws which prompted Congress to pass § 1985(3).16 s Indeed, the
district court in N. Y.N.O. W. found "quite persuasive plaintiffs' analogy
between defendants' activities, seeking forcibly to prevent women from
exercising their constitutional right to decide whether to terminate a
pregnancy, and the organized actions of the Ku Klux Klan that inspired
the Forty-Second Congress to enact section 1985(3)."166
Although the district court in N. Y.N.O. W. held for the plaintiffs on
their right to abortion claim, the Second Circuit declined to rule on this
issue on appeal. Instead, the circuit found that because "the interference
with a right to travel [was] an independent constitutional ground upon
which to affirm the district court's § 1985(3) holding, it [was] unneces-
162. N. Y.N.O. W., 704 F. Supp. at 1250-51. The protests took place between April 30 and May
7, 1988. Id.
163. 503 Held in Abortion Protest on F 85th St., N.Y. Times, May 3, 1988, at B1, col. 2.
164. N. Y.N.O. W., 704 F. Supp. at 1251.
165. Representative Garfield described the Act as a remedy for the "systematic maladministra-
tion of [the laws], or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess., App. 153 (Apr. 4, 1871). See also hi at 317 (statement ofRep. Shellabarger) (expressing a fear
that local law enforcement authorities in the South were unlikely to protect the rights of people
affiliated with Reconstruction policies).
166. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1259 n.13 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
sary... to rule on this constitutional claim."' 67
In National Organization for Women, a Virginia district court found
that Commonwealth Women's Clinic had been the target of "rescue"
demonstrations "on almost a weekly basis for the last five years."' 168
During "rescue" demonstrations protestors often overwhelm local police
forces which rarely, if ever, have occasion to deal with disturbances of a
similar magnitude. In the Virginia case, trial testimony determined that
on October 9, 1988, the thirty members of the Falls Church Police De-
partment were unable to prevent a clinic from being closed down for over
six hours, notwithstanding the fact that the police managed to arrest two
hundred and forty protestors.169 The court concluded that "[l]imited po-
lice department resources combined with the typical absence of any ad-
vance notice identifying a target clinic renders it difficult for local police
to prevent rescuers from closing a facility for some period of time.' 170
This blockade was not an isolated incident. For example, the facts of
National Organization for Women show that one of the targeted clinics
had been subjected to "rescue" demonstrations "on almost a weekly basis
for the last five (5) years.' 171
Despite this hinderance of state enforcement, the district court de-
clined to rule on the right to abortion claim because of uncertainty about
the security of that right following the recent Supreme Court ruling in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 72 Discussing plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the right to an abortion is of such a fundamental character as
to be guaranteed against private interference, the Virginia district court
stated that:
Such a claim is problematic, both because it is novel and because Webster
suggests that the law concerning a putative abortion right is in a state of
flux. Given this and given that there is another independent basis for relief
under Section 1985(3), the Court conclude[d] that it is unnecessary and
imprudent to venture into this thicket. Courts should avoid constitutional
questions where other grounds are available and dispositive of the issues
presented. 173
167. New York State National Organization for Women v. Terry, 886, F.2d 1339, 1361 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
168. 726 F. Supp. at 1489.
169. Id. at n.4.
170. ML
171. Id at 1489.
172. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
173. 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1494 (E.D. Va. 1989) (citations omitted). The Court continued this
discussion in a footnote saying:
Although the [Supreme] Court noted that the facts of Webster did not present an appro-
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Another view has found limited support in the Eighth Circuit. In
Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc.74 the court addressed the state action
requirement of § 1985(3) and found that a cause of action had been
stated against a "mock abortion clinic" run by an anti-abortion group.
The facts of this case illustrate another method used by anti-abortion
conspirators to prevent abortions. Warna Lewis, a woman wishing an
abortion, answered an advertisement for the "AAA Pregnancy Problem
Center" which she had found listed in the Yellow Pages under "Abortion
Information and Services." After arriving for her appointment, she was
offered a free pregnancy test. She provided the "Center" with a urine
sample and was asked to wait for the results. During this period she was
shown slides which were "said to illustrate the abortion process. These
included pictures of dismembered fetuses and abortions being performed
by means of crude-appearing instruments. The slide show also contained
intermittent family scenes."' 75 After being confronted by Lewis, a staff
member suggested she "rely on religious faith." Lewis' insistence that
she still wanted an abortion caused the staff member to offer to "arrange
an abortion with a 'respectable doctor.' ",176 Lewis arrived at the ar-
ranged place and time only to discover that it was a Roman Catholic
Hospital which did not perform abortions. A week later she had her
pregnancy terminated elsewhere. A month later the staff member called
"to find out when the baby was due." Lewis sued. 77
The court found that the right asserted by Lewis - the right to
choose to have an abortion - was based on the "rights of privacy recog-
nized by Roe v. Wade... which are incorporated under [Carpenters] into
section 1985(3)" and, therefore, is not limited to protection "against only
priate occasion to overturn Roe, its decision left Roe ripe for attack. See Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989). Justice Rehnquist, speaking for
the Court in Webster, explained, "[sJtare decisis is a cornerstone of our legal system, but
is has less power in constitutional cases, where, save for constitutional amendments, this
Court is the only body able to make needed changes. We have not refrained from recon-
sideration of a prior construction of the Constitution that has proved 'unsound in princi-
ple and unworkable in practice.'" We think the Roe trimester framework falls into that
category.... Since the bounds [of Roe] are essentially indeterminate, the result has been
a web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regula-
tions rather than a body of constitutional doctrine.
Id. at n.13 (citing Webster, 492 U.S. at 518-19).
174. 908 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1990),rehearing granted, en banc, vacated, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS
15937, rehearing denied, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1991) (by an equally divided court the judgment of
the district court was affirmed), petition for cert, Docket 90-1575 (April 10, 1991).
175. Id. at 319.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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official conduct." 178  As a result the court specifically held that
"§ 1985(3) does not contain a state action requirement where, as here, a
plaintiff's claim finds its course in the right announced in Roe v.
Wade." 179
The Lewis court also found that the plaintiff's claim stated a cause of
action arising under state law which prohibits the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. "Since section 1985(3) contains no independent state
action requirement, it is possible that, if the rights at issue give rise to a
private right of action under state law, state involvement is not required
under section § 1985(3). " 180 This finding was based on the import of the
Griffin Court's holding that the conspiracy must intend to deny the
plaintiff "the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all." 18 1
Although vacated on remand, this holding is the proper interpretation of
§ 1985(3).
In contrast, by seizing on the interference with the right to travel
claim, the National Organization for Women court was able to dispose of
the action in favor of the plaintiffs without having to decide the right to
abortion issue. However, had the court properly construed the statute, it
would have found that, whether the "putative abortion right is in a state
of flux" is irrelevant to deciding a § 1985(3) claim. The text of § 1985(3)
does not limit itself to the protection of constitutional rights. It is direct
178. Id. at 321-22.
179. Id. at 322.
180. Id. at 323.
181. Id. (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Calling it "particularly in-
sightful," the Lewis court quoted Professor Ken Gormley's article Private Conspiracies and the Con-
stitution: A Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C Section 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REv. 527 (1985). Lewis, 908
F.2d at 323. The court found persuasive Professor Gormley's observation that:
[S]ection 1985(3) - unlike section 1983 - does not require the deprivation of some
constitutional or federally protected right. It speaks only of the deprivation of the equal
protection of the laws. Thus, the rights at stake in section 1985(3) cases need not be the
more familiar first or fourteenth amendment guarantees, or any other right found in the
United States Constitution. Instead, the right at stake will normally be the equal protec-
tion of state laws - trespass laws, contract laws, property laws, and tort laws. These
sorts of rights have a life all their own, with or without state action. Properly framing a
complaint in this fashion prevents the obvious faux pas committed by the litigants in
[Carpenters] - namely, drawing up a complaint that rests on rights which do not even
exist. Properly framed, a complaint alleging a conspiracy by private individuals to strip
a member of some traditionally disadvantaged class of the equal protection of the laws
states a valid claim under section 1985(3). In a world where state action and private
conduct often intersect, Congress is empowered to reach such discriminatory conduct to
assure that "equal protection" is not just a phrase in the back of the Constitution, but
something which all groups in America can actually enjoy.
64 TEX. L. REv. at 587 (emphasis in original).
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and simple, prohibiting a conspirator to do or "cause to be done, any act
in furtherance of the object of [a] conspiracy whereby another is ...
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States."' 82 Webster's impact on a woman's fundamental right to
obtain an abortion may be unknown, but abortion remains a civil liberty
for women today. It exists as a right under state law. The language of
the statute is unambiguous, regardless of whether abortion is character-
ized as a "fundamental right" arising under the United States Constitu-
tion or a "legal privilege" arising under state law. If militant anti-
abortion protestors successftlly prevent the State from being able to se-
cure for women their legal option to have an abortion, then the claim is
actionable under the Ku Klux Klan Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
The organized lawlessness of militant anti-abortion conspirators has
left many state and local authorities unable to secure for women the legal
option to voluntarily terminate pregnancy. This problem, which cur-
rently confronts women and advocates of women's rights, is analogous to
the problems confronting African-Americans and their supporters dur-
ing the aftermath of the Civil War. Using § 1985(3) to prevent anti-abor-
tion conspirators from attempting to restrict women's reproductive
freedom by blockading facilities that offer pregnancy-related services is
consistent with both the text of the statute and the remedy which the
framers of the Ku Klux Klan Act intended to provide. Although
§ 1985(3) provides an appropriate vehicle for such a remedy, two pri-
mary obstacles reduce the likelihood of successful action. First, the
Supreme Court's failure to explicate a methodology for determining
classes which warrant the protection of the Ku Klux Klan Act has left
the potential for inconsistent and haphazard application of the statute.
Second, clinics unable to demonstrate an interstate patient-base must
overcome the barrier created by the obscure state involvement
requirement.
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182. Lewis, 908 F.2d at 321.

